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The Royal Navy and its
seagoing reserves from the late Seventeenth to mid Twentieth Centuries
by Len Barnett
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While this website guide primarily covers
historical and technical matters relating to the Royal Navy and its reserves,
reference is also made to some records, as well as the mercantile marine,
fishing fleets and other associated maritime groups and matters.
A
brief historical essay up to and including the Second World War
Many claims have been made as to the
origins of the Royal Navy, including as far back as concurrent with the late 11th
century Norman invasion of southern England. Some people rather incredibly even
regard Anglo-Romano naval activity similarly. Certainly by mediaeval times
there were armed ships belonging to English monarchs and defence commitments
required of the Cinque Ports.
The highly militaristic Tudor King Henry VIII can be seen as
important in the forming of a true monarch’s (or royal) navy in England. As
well as increasing the investment made by his father Henry VII in royal owned
armed merchant ships, building began on the first three royal dockyards at
Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham in the 1540s. What is more a Council for
Marine Causes also came into being during this decade. In many respects the
forerunner of the Navy Board (that dealt with important aspects of shore
administration including shipbuilding and repair). This allowed for something
of a standing force, rather than a pure reliance on ad hoc merchant hulls
acquired when wanted. This council apparently also dealt with matters of Admiralty
- that were at this stage purely the appointments of sea officers and the
deployments of vessels. (Incidentally, this should not be confused with the
High Court of Admiralty that had dealt with maritime legal disputes since at
least the 14th century.) Also, even though admirals had long been
placed in command of groups of ships, there was little of the modern sense of
command and control, something that can be seen in the later Elizabethan
operations: especially against the grand Spanish Armada in 1588.
Pre-dating Henry VIII’s naval exploits as shown above was the
formation of an armed Royal Navy in Scotland under King James IV. With French
building expertise this force was already taking shape by 1502. Although a
naval arms race followed with the English and there was some combat in
the earlier part of the 16th century, relations between the two
countries became less violent. As a result of this, under James V the Scottish
Navy withered away to nothing.
Anyway, through marriage rather than warfare, in 1603 the
Scottish Stuarts eventually gained the English throne on the death of the
barren Protestant Elizabeth I. Under James VI of Scotland and James I of
England, it is often stated there was less emphasis on naval affairs. If the
case, this would not have been entirely surprising, considering the politics of
the era. So the charge of interest waning at the highest levels leading to
indifferent administration and corruption is not entirely unnatural. Often
overlooked was the building of excellent ships though. His son, Charles I, King
of England, Scotland and Ireland, also oversaw the upkeep of these and
improvements in the Royal dockyards. In relation to operational direction, Lord
High Admirals were appointed: although this position fell into abeyance after
1628 when the incumbent was murdered.
By 1642 those on the king’s ships were far from contented, with
a number of concerns including greatly outstanding pay (even by the standards
of the era). When the civil wars broke out that year both ships and personnel
of the standing navy, under the talented Earl of Warwick, went over to
Parliament almost in their entirety - 1st to 6th rated
vessels and their commanders. Almost completely forgotten historically,
this force was an important element in Parliament’s victory over the monarchy.
Although disputed by newly raised Royalist vessels, generally ‘command of the
sea’ was maintained around these islands in denying the Crown potential
continental military support. And, there was also naval support to parliamentary
military operations ashore.
Although not free from its own problems by any means,
interestingly, for a ‘royal’ navy, it was through the Puritan Commonwealth
(1649-59) that the State’s armed vessels began to act as a genuinely
disciplined seagoing navy though. Not particularly auspicious during the civil
wars, severe reverses experienced in the First Anglo Dutch War
(especially in 1652) required real improvements. Not only was a code of
discipline first promulgated in 1653 (to become the Articles of War in 1661),
so too was a too was the tactical doctrine of fleet action, which was becoming
necessary with the development of ships specifically built for the prosecution
of war. It can be said that the Cromwellian generals
sent to sea engendered something of the spirit of the New Model Army afloat.
Even so, there were retrograde steps as well. Under the military dictatorship
that the Commonwealth effectively developed into, the established boards
of shore administration and admiralty were abolished (although the functions
were subsequently carried out by naval and admiralty commissioners).
With the Restoration (of the monarchy) in 1660 came a period of
far reaching naval reform: even if not down to Charles II as such. Admittedly
through powerful patronage, Samuel Pepys was instrumental in this. Initially he
had been appointed clerk of the acts to the reconstituted Navy Board that was
then the executive body under James, Duke of York. Later Pepys became the first
secretary to the Admiralty from 1673. A highly important aspect of holding a
naval commission was from 1677 a requirement of professional examinations for
the rank of lieutenant. One of Pepys’ most outstanding accomplishments, this
sprung from his desire to forge a professional officer corps. In particular he
wished to curb the excesses of officers with patronage but little expertise,
while giving ‘tarpaulin’ officers (those skilled but without social advantages)
a better chance for promotion and such examination can be seen as revolutionary
in its day.
Apart from the trade wars with the Dutch, through the latter
half of the 17th century there had been a number of other
hostilities with the main European players - France and Spain. Often
bewildering to anyone other than experts, one time enemies not only made up
their differences, but often then became allies in conflict against their own
past friends as the regnalistic, political, religious
and economic situations changed. These continued through the 18th
century, with Britain never having a period of even twenty years when not
fighting one or more rivals. (In 1707 there had been the final formal Act of
Union between England and Scotland.) By mid century these conflicts were being
conducted across the globe and the Seven Years War (1756-63) can be seen legitimately
in terms of a ‘world war’. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815)
that followed on from all the rest were inherently different in spirit, but the
apparent maximization and utter ruthlessness of these struggles were merely the
end result of military processes that had been growing for a very long time.
Through these almost never-ending wars leading to 1815 the Royal
Navy had developed greatly. As well as operating collectively as fleets in
battle and blockade, tactics evolved for evolutions such as cruising and
fighting single ship and small actions. Trade defence had been regarded as
highly important and merchantmen were convoyed to and from the colonies. And,
amphibious operations, including gunfire support operations, were part of the
traditional way of war fighting. (Another, at a political level, was paying
allies to conduct land campaigns out of the direct reach of Britain.) These
tactics had been hard learned, often with reverses and embarrassments in the
interim.
Often gunnery is given pride of place in explaining British
naval supremacy. The reality is actually far more difficult to determine and
probably more accurately relates not to the superiority of the British, but the
inferiority (for many reasons mostly political) of her enemies. Interestingly,
recent research by Professor Michael Duffy into gunnery training prior to the
battle of Trafalgar (21st October 1805), shows that there was not
the relentless practice that has been traditionally claimed. Nevertheless,
generally the British were better trained, employing highly destructive tactics
such as firing into hulls rather than into sails and rigging; employing
multiple shotting causing extreme splinter damage; as
well as being capable of firing at faster rates than their opponents. But, in
modern military terms there was also considerable ‘blue on blue’ at Trafalgar -
more readily understood by the general public as ‘friendly fire’. This caused
not inconsiderable British casualties and while commented on at the time, has not
been dwelt upon since.
Ashore, the administration and direction of the monarch’s ships
also developed. While after the Restoration it was the Navy Board that
basically ran the navy, this had fundamentally altered over a century. Again
Lord High Admirals had been appointed from 1708, but at this time the board of
commissioners of the Admiralty was not seen as necessarily heading the service.
But under capable men such as Admiral Lord Anson by mid century the
administrative changes had accumulated, leading to a form where the Admiralty
conducted it’s core of
direction of naval policy and directed the various boards that dealt with
specialist aspects. By this time the Navy Board saw to the, design, building
and maintenance of warships, the running of the royal dockyards and providing
and maintaining the complex naval stores for warships. Naval finance, including
the payment of officers and men was the responsibility of the Treasurer of the
Navy. While nominally a member of the Navy Board acted partially independently
in spending the funds variously acquired, although the offices of this board
handled most of the day-today accounts. Victuals were handled by the
Victualling Board that had its own shore facilities. Guns, ammunition and the
like were the authority of the Ordnance Board. The Commissioners for Sick and
Wounded Seamen (or the ‘Sick and Hurt Board’) operated naval hospitals and
other medical responsibilities and also oversaw the keep of Prisoners of War.
As per normal after major conflict, the Royal Navy was run down
after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Some organisational
rationalisation followed in 1832, with the Admiralty subsuming all the
subsidiary boards. There were periodic departmental changes subsequently, such
as having ordnance controlled by the War Office for some time later in the
century and the addition of new departments, the Naval Intelligence Department
being one. Nevertheless, the organisation remained relatively constant and
unfortunately, many of the ancient ways of conducting business continued,
including the rather convoluted votes system.
Contrary to popular belief there had traditionally been a keen
interest in the employment of new technology within the navy, one example being
the mass machine production of blocks in the 18th century. In the
long period of peace post 1815 the policy changed to partially that of a
watching brief. So, while there was substantial experimentation, often this was
on the back of trends already developing in the outside world. So, iron-framed
hulls necessary for mounting steam engines, the engines themselves, along with
paddles then screws were introduced relatively rapidly. By mid century ordnance
was changing and experiments were being carried out on wrought iron as armour.
The mis-named Crimean War (1853-56) first indicated
how effective mine warfare might be, with Anglo-French naval actions
significantly hindered. The American Civil War (1861-65) really showed
how naval warfare might develop and not necessarily in favour of the great
powers. Interestingly, in a background of severe budgetary limitations in the
1870s there was an acceleration in experimentation
resulting in numerous warship hybrids (especially as the French Navy was once
again in a position to impinge on British hegemony). The 1880s brought the
British military takeover of Egypt, a war scare with Russia and political
lobbying for increased naval spending (partially through efforts of some naval
officers). This proved effective as the next decade brought about increased
building programmes of battleships and cruisers: just as the French Jeune Ecole
prophesied the end of large warships through the use of torpedoes launched from
small craft. This however proved rather premature, as early torpedoes lacked
speed and endurance. So, some varieties of British cruisers and battleships
generally became ever larger and weightier, deploying heavier and heavier
weapons in bids to keep ahead of both the French and Russians. By the turn of
the century there was already something a ‘fusion’ between the large armoured
cruisers and smaller battleships: especially in the mind of Admiral
Sir John Fisher. With the continued building programmes, the ‘all big gun’
warship became inevitable, as articulated in the Dreadnought battleships
and battlecruisers (although already previously designed and promoted by the
Italian Vittorio Cuniberti).
To shift these massive warships increased power was required and not only were
turbines used in these, oil fuel was beginning to be used as an auxiliary fuel
in a number of types of ships. By this time the main perceived threat came from
the German Imperial Navy (Kaiserliche
Marine). And so the building went on...
Without delving too deeply, many other types of war fighting
craft had also been developed. As well as many differing sizes of cruisers
required for various roles, torpedo boat destroyers were aimed to counter the
small torpedo craft. Submarine design had already evolved significantly. Mine warfare, both in
offence and defence, was also becoming more sophisticated. And, even aircraft
were beginning to be regarded as interesting in some naval quarters
before 1914. Even so, big ships and battle fleets were seen as of overriding
importance in maintaining ‘command of the sea’. By this doctrine, often
simplistically associated with an American naval officer named Mahan but in
reality already in vogue, such ‘command’ would allow for one’s own use of the
sea, both military and civilian, while denying this to one’s opponent(s).
The acid test of war between 1914 and 1918 proved that there
were many basic weaknesses in the R.N. though. Far from ‘ruling the
waves’ and in spite of a great deal of propagandist rhetoric maintaining
Britannia’s might that still assails the British public, the performance
of much of the Royal Navy can be regarded as barely adequate and even poor much
of the time. In essence, instead of major ‘Dreadnought’ victory followed by a
bold exercise of the ‘command of the sea’, each side assumed strategic
defensives, with occasional sweeps and at least earlier in raids carried out by
the Germans. In areas of ‘disputed command’ (a term used by the British
strategist Sir Julian Corbett) all around the British Isles, throughout the
North Sea, in the Mediterranean and the Aegean (as the main areas of British naval
operations) the fighting was unrelenting. But this was conducted by all sorts
of small craft, from destroyers, through submarines, fishing boats and even
motor yachts (never mind the more esoteric vessels in ‘special service’) and merchantmen.
Saliently, it was not the pukkah R.N. that was
involved in the majority of this combat (with the exception of some destroyer
work and air operations later) Instead, this was
relegated to merchant mariners and fishermen both in civilian employ and in the
Royal Naval Reserve, along with the amateurs of the Royal Naval Volunteer
Reserve.
One incredibly important facet of British ‘defence’ policy that
had been badly handled from the mid 19th century through to the war
was in trade defence. Undoubtedly, lessons were learned, but it was not until
late in 1916 that the Admiralty began to take merchant sinkings at all
seriously. Even after earlier periods of unrestricted submarine warfare
conducted against merchantmen from early 1915 onwards, it still took the R.N. a
depressingly long time to employ tactics to effectively combat the sustained U-boat assault from the spring of 1917 onwards.
And, it was not really until the final three months of the conflict that
the situation was turned around satisfactorily and this was brought about just
as much from governmental reorganization and outside pressure than from purely
naval input.
The inter-war period was once again one of retrenchment, both in
terms of matériel and tactical thought. In a world suffering badly from
the effects of the mass industrialised slaughter, not surprisingly there was
little interest in lavishing money on maintaining armed forces and in most
countries (not still in conflict) these were massively cut back. Thus the R.N.
in many respects returned to pre World War doctrines.
With exceptions, for those of the officer corps that were retained the old reliance on the battleship continued
undiminished. In time the Japanese were regarded as the principal future enemy,
but tactical planning was unrealistic, partially but not exclusively due to the
money available. Air power might have been seen as the way forward, not just
because of the new theories abounding, but also since the navy had been very
active in developing this in the Great War and this had proved a not
insignificant factor in conducting combat operations - especially against
submarines. Of course, this failure to develop sensible air policy was to a
significant degree down to the politics of the era, with a lack of cooperation
with the newly formed Royal Air Force and even when some responsibilities were
returned to a Fleet Air Arm there was not the money to develop this
effectively. (The R.A.F. had its own problems though. Seen as a ‘cheap’ way of
policing the Empire compared with the army, bombing operations in Somalia, Iraq
and the North West Frontier, otherwise known as Afghanistan, took up much of it’s resources. But, from the mid
1930s air defence for the home island started to be taken seriously - finally
countering the past self-fulfilling prophesy of ‘the bomber always getting
through’ caused by the very lack of research and development into air-defence
capabilities.) Amphibious operations, as recently researched by Professor
Richard Harding, were another area that suffered for the same lack of funding
and the R.N.’s inability to interact effectively: primarily with the army
there. Even in relation to anti-submarine warfare there were weaknesses in
A.S.D.I.C., although as shown by a currently serving naval officer, Lieutenant
G.D. Franklin R.N., these were not anywhere as bad as was maintained post war
by the official naval historian, Captain Stephen Roskill.
For all their problems the Royal Navy fought fiercely in the
Second World War. There were a number of real disasters down to poor warship
design and associated tactical concepts - the losses of Hood, Prince of Wales and
Repulse probably being the most
remembered. Stretched to its limit and beyond in a war that far from being
conducted close to home and in the Mediterranean (as was basically the
situation during the First World War), was this time on a truly worldwide
basis. Really hammered at times, such as during the battle of Crete in
1941 when German aircraft in particular inflicted grievous punishment on
cruisers and destroyers, somehow they managed to carry on. And, not all the
lessons had been forgotten from the First World War either (in some parts of
officialdom at least). Trade defence this time was seen as absolutely essential
and serious investments were made, in escorts and aircraft, to keep the flow of
goods going. In time both the Italian and German naval threats were largely
negated. (Nevertheless, according to one expert, Lieutenant-Commander Malcolm
Llewellyn-Jones Ph.D., R.N. (Retired), the Germans were developing very
sophisticated submarines that could potentially have wreaked havoc on Allied
convoys.) By May 1945, although recognisable as a junior partner to the United
States’ Navy, the Royal Navy was far from beaten. Air power was by then an
inherent element of the order of battle and the British had numerous aircraft
carriers in the Pacific.
Structures
of Ranks and Rates
Naval
structures of ranks and rates have always been complicated and prior to the
Victorian era may appear totally alien to individuals otherwise familiar with
the R.N. These in particular require explanation.
In the
days of yore warships, as already mentioned, were merely mercantile vessels
acquired as and when necessary: sometimes with ‘castles’ constructed fore and
aft as platforms for soldiers to fight from at close quarters. Since these
became military units captains who were in charge of the soldiers took overall
command. The seamen were there to handle the vessels and were commanded by
ships’ masters.
With the
growth of cannonry and ships specifically built for war, in time, there were
fundamental changes in command. An executive branch evolved, whereby the
military commanders were also seamen and these men held commissions from the
monarch of the day. They were known as sea officers. By the late 18th
century these ranks had developed as follows. Flag officers,
that is those commanding fleets or squadrons (at sea) headed the list.
If appointed, the highest rank was admiral of the fleet, followed by admirals,
vice admirals, rear admirals and commodores. This last rank was temporary,
whereby captains were given authority of rear admirals, but did not contribute
to seniority in any way. Captain, or post-captain to quote the proper term, was
next and designated men in command of sizeable warships. The next in seniority
were commanders. As a rank this did not exist officially until 1794, although
many officers held this as a title. All officers commanding warships were
commanders, whether post-captains in first rate battleships, or at the other
end lieutenants in minor vessels such as mortar ketches. Lieutenants were one
rank below that of commander and this was then the lowest truly commissioned
rank. As understudies to commanders such men had their own pecking order, the
first lieutenant often being second in command, the second lieutenant third in command
and so on. As already mentioned lieutenants could also be in positions of
command. In this situation they held more authority than others with the same
rank and consequentially they could be known as the ‘lieutenant in command’, or
‘lieutenant commander’.
Even with
an executive organisation, a number of essential specialists were required for
the efficient running of men-o-war. These men held warrants from the various
boards and were also sea officers. Although commissioned officers qualified in
navigation, on all but the smallest vessels an expert navigator was employed.
These warrant officers were known as masters and gained their qualifications
from Trinity House, but were responsible to the Admiralty. They took
quarterdeck watches and could even command H.M. vessels other than
warships. In this case they were known as ‘master and commander’. Gunners were
regulated through the Ordnance Board and looked after ships’ guns and
ammunition. Carpenters were very important in the ‘wooden world’ and
were concerned with the maintenance of ships’ hulls, masts and spars. Although
appointed by the Admiralty, often they had previously been dockyard workers
employed by the Navy Board and were responsible to this latter board.
Boatswains, again appointed by the Admiralty but responsible to the Navy Board,
by this time were in charge of rigging and ground tackle as well as the storage
of sails, cordage and the like.
Surgeons
were also warrant officers and were appointed by the Navy Board until 1796.
Before appointment they too were examined until 1745 by the Barber-Surgeons’
Board, then the Surgeons’ Board until 1796. The Sick and Hurt Board then took
over both roles of examination and appointment, at least temporarily. Pursers
were different, inasmuch as they were not professionally examined. But, as
partially State employed businessmen, they had to put
up financial guarantees and were appointed by the Admiralty. Their role was to
deal with supply, particularly of victuals, slops (clothes) and consumable
stores of many (but not all) varieties.
Next,
there were ‘inferior’ officer classes and confusingly, some of these also held
warrants, but were rated as petty officers. Armourers and gunsmiths (the latter
in large ships only) were accountable daily to the gunner and responsible to
the Ordnance Board. Masters-at-Arms, frequently once army or marine sergeants,
were warranted by the Admiralty to instruct in small arms. Sailmakers, worked
understandably for ships’ boatswains and received their warrants from the Navy
Board. These specialists had learned their trade as dockyard artificers and
very late in the 18th century caulkers, ropemakers
and coopers also apparently began going to sea in this way. Cooks were once
warranted through the Admiralty, but from 1704 by the Navy Board. Chaplains
and schoolmasters, when carried, were also in this category. Both received their
warrants from the Admiralty, the former being examined by the Bishop of London
and the latter by Trinity House (in navigation).
The other group of ‘inferior’ officers were also rated petty
officer, by ships’ commanders although only through recourse to higher
authority. It might be surprising to some, but midshipmen at this time were
within this category. By the end of the 18th century generally this
senior petty officers’ rate was for ‘young gentlemen’ on their way to taking
their lieutenants’ examinations, but not entirely. Master’s mate was very
similar. As commissioned officers required knowledge of navigation, often aspiring
officers would take this rate, although many including some ‘young gentlemen’
took warrants as masters instead. Yet more in this rate did not seek either
warrants or commissions and were merely experienced seamen. Incidentally, both
masters’ mates and midshipmen were generally referred to as ‘mates’.
The rest of ships’ companies were made up of the ‘people’. Some
of these were also rated (and disrated) petty officer by ships’ commanders.
Seamen petty officers included quartermasters and their mates and boatswains’
mates. Idlers, that is men who did not keep watches,
also had petty officer rates such as armourers’ mates, pursers’ stewards and
captains’ clerks.
Those without petty officer rates were often referred to as
‘private men’. Unofficially at this point, there were others, such as captains
of tops, who although only rated able seamen were in half way positions of
authority. Further complicating matters some of these, such as quarter gunners
received slightly more pay. For seamen, there were then able, ordinary and
landsmen rates depending on their skill and experience. (Please note that there
are inconsistencies in published works as to when the rate of landsman was
introduced.) For youngsters, until 1794 there were the rates of captain’s
servant, or servant. These ‘servant’ capacities were then replaced by three
varieties of ‘boy’. Those in the first class were rated ‘volunteers’ and were
would be officers; Boys 2nd class were young seamen aged 15 to 17;
and Boys 3rd class were those intended as seamen but still employed
as domestics.
As for the other ‘private men’ who were not watchkeepers, there
were all sorts of rates for those at the bottom of the heap. These included the
steward’s mate, cook’s mate, captain’s cook and yeomen of the boatswain’s store.
Perhaps an obvious point to some, nevertheless, one that
needs making is that holders of commissions and warrants (not just ‘inferior’
officers either), will have previously spent time as private men of some
variety or other. Also, it should be noted that often there were plenty of
other people onboard. Among these could be wives of some sea officers as well
as their offspring, adding already to the youngsters as part of ships’
companies.
Being an evolving organisation it should hardly be surprising
that inherent changes occurred from time to time. One of these was in officer
entry. So, before going onto these the situation in the late 18th
century should be outlined. Apart from joining through the patronage of
individual commanders (especially those more senior) as servants (if only in
name), there had been other ways for young gentlemen intent on a life as
commissioned officers. As of 1676 there had been volunteers
per order, or ‘King’s letter boys’ as they were known. In 1733 the Royal
Naval Academy at Portsmouth came into existence (renamed as the Royal Naval
College in 1806) and this replaced the old system of ‘King’s letter boys’. On
completion of three years studying there, youngsters then went to sea as
midshipmen ordinary. However, this affected a very small percentage and in 1838
or 1839 the R.N.C. closed. In 1843 a new rank of naval cadet came into use,
altering in nature with changed recruitment and educational
requirements through the century and beyond.
In time other commissioned officers’ ranks appeared as well
(with some terms, such as master and commander disappearing). Without going
into some of the complexities, in 1840 the rank of mate was formally introduced
as a commissioned officer rank below lieutenant. This was changed to
sub-lieutenant twenty years later (re-using a term sometimes used since the 18th
century for inferior officers second in command of vessels so diminutive that
their establishments only allowed for one single commissioned officer onboard).
It should also be explained that the rank mate was resurrected once more in
1912, for ratings advanced to commissioned status. This differentiation was
done away with only in 1931, when they too were termed sub-lieutenants. A rank
between lieutenant and commander was introduced in 1914 - lieutenant-commander.
This was gained automatically on serving eight years as a lieutenant.
Apparently this was to generally fall into line with army ranks, but it also
formalised the half-ring already worn by ‘lieutenants of eight years or more
seniority’. Much further up the career scale, commodores were put on a better
footing in 1805 with two classes of the rank, although they remained temporary
ranks. Sometime post 1945 this was simplified to one single rank of commodore.
Admirals’ ranks also periodically changed slightly, which is to be expected due
to massive differences in order of battle from one period to the next. One
noticeable change was in 1805 when an additional rank of admiral of the red was
introduced. In 1864 this disappeared with one of many
reorganizations.
The status of warrant officer ranks altered dramatically through
time as well. The first important act was in 1808 and affected masters,
pursers, surgeons and chaplains. Through this they became ‘Warrant Officers of
Commissioned Rank’ and generally allowed into the wardroom. This began the
gentrification of these roles, while at the same time reducing the status of
the others such as carpenters, gunners and boatswains. In 1843 at least some
masters became navigating lieutenants, only to disappear into the Executive
Branch in 1872. (Entry and promotion within the navigating branch was far more
complex than is commonly understood though. Masters, from the lower-deck were
still being warranted as late as 1866, while there had been navigating
sub-lieutenants from at least 1863 in what would appear to have been through an
‘officer entry’ route.) Pursers were also commissioned in 1843 as paymasters
and pursers, with ‘purser’ being dropped from their rank in the 1850s. Surgeons
were also elevated to commissioned rank in 1843. Chaplains were given
commissioned status in 1859, but in time their position was to become rather
hazy. On the other hand, until the end of the Second World War carpenters and
boatswains remained as warrant officers, as the highest ranking ratings
(with carpenters being re-rated as warrant shipwrights in 1918). (It should
also be noted that there were commissioned carpenter ranks as well by the First
World War era.) Gunners fared relatively better, while remaining as warrant officers, relatively few were to allowed to become
commissioned gunners much later. The ‘inferior’ warrant officers (not already
dealt with), either disappeared completely, or were
re-designed more formally within the systems of petty officer rates devised
from the 1860s onwards.
From working on original documents it has become apparent that,
at least in the case of masters and as late as the mid 1850s, not all had been
commissioned. This may also have been the case with other warrant
officers. Also, specialist navigating lieutenants remained in existence for a
considerable period after 1872.
Recruitment on the lower deck also changed inherently in
the 19th century. Although it is not apparent from some accounts there
had been genuine volunteers for the monarch’s warships. The reasons for such
‘people’ wanting a life at sea on men-o-war were as complex as at any other
time, although sometimes this was due to something akin to modern nationalism
(that did not generally exist in mainland Europe until mid 19th
century). It is clear from some research that commanders, especially the landed
gentry, took large numbers of individuals to sea from their own localities, or
even estates. Whether for the lower deck or ultimately quarterdeck, this was a
way hopefully of increasing numbers of followers (as part and parcel of the
games of patronage and advancement). Of course, there were large numbers forced
into the King’s service, not only through the press, but
also in other schemes such as the Quota. To explain, during 1795 the judiciary
had been authorised to send to warships ‘rogues, vagabonds, smugglers,
embezzlers of naval stores and other able-bodied, idle and disorderly persons
exercising no lawful employment and not having some substance sufficient for
their support and maintenance’. Others, poor young lads who could be orphans,
runaways and those just regarded as ‘suspect’ were sent through the Marine
Society to merchantmen and warships. But, for reasons already mentioned in the
historical essay, by the 1830s the old ways were becoming less workable. In
relation to this between 1835 and 1857 a whole series of experiments were made
by the British State in keeping tabs on the entire British merchant service,
with the aim of forcing specific classes into the Royal Navy in time of war.
These exercises, normally known as the ‘ticketing system’ failed
for a whole raft of reasons. But, it is clear that the raison d’être for
this was becoming non-existent anyway. On the back on an earlier limited
programme (also begun in 1835), increasingly from 1853 engagements of
continuous service for ratings were introduced. Nevertheless, twenty-five years
later this process was still far from complete and well into the 20th
century there were some groups that were not allowed engagements of continuous
service.
Needless to say, through the 19th and 20th
centuries, as technology developed new branches were introduced. Again there
are lots of anomalies, such as in the Engineering Branch where officers for a
long time were very much looked down upon by the Executive Branch as social
inferiors.
Naval reserves also came into being, the Royal
Naval Reserve, drawn from professional civilian mariners as of 1859; and the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, that originally were interested amateurs from
1903. There was also the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve from 1903 and other
organisations such as the Royal Fleet Reserve are also outlined in the above
linked page. The
Coastguard was also a direct Admiralty
responsibility from 1857 to 1923, although there had been relatively deep
ties for some time before.
Tracing individuals and further research
Naval
documentation was exceedingly complicated and this online guide does not now attempt to deal with this in detail.
Nevertheless, the basics are described in various sections dependent on rank
and rate.
These
sections are as follows:-
Commissioned Officers (and for
ease mates, midshipmen and naval cadets) from the earliest surviving year until
the inter-war period;
Standing
warrant officers (when they were sea officers) forms the
second; and
The ‘people’ or
ratings as they developed through time.
Of course, personnel and associated records only form one tiny
aspect relating to research into the R.N. Following is a list of publications
that give good information on social aspects of naval life:-
N.A.M.
Rodger: The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London:
Fontana Press, 1986)
Brian Lavery: Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation
1793-1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1990)
Michael
Lewis: A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815 (London: George Allen
& Unwin Ltd, 1960)
Michael
Lewis: The Navy in Transition: A Social History 1814-1864 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965)
Henry Baynham: Before the Mast: Naval Ratings of the 19th
Century (London: Hutchinson, 1971)
Henry Baynham: Men from the Dreadnoughts (London:
Hutchinson, 1976)
John Fabb (Commentaries): Victorian and Edwardian Navy from
old photographs (London: B.T. Batsford, 1976)
Christopher
McKee: Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2002)
Brian Lavery: Hostilities Only: Training the Wartime Navy (London:
National Maritime Museum, 2005)
Hannen Swaffer: What would Nelson do? (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946)
Return to structures of
ranks and rates
Return to Tracing individuals
and further research